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WHEN PUBLIC SERVICES CONTRACTS ARE POORLY 





This paper contributes to the debate about the understanding of contextual factors in 
contracting out public services in developing countries. It argues that contractual rela-
tionships that the Ministry of Health enters with faith-based health service providers in 
Malawi are not effective due to poor design, implementation and management ar-
rangements. As a result the contracts have become more mechanisms for quantitative 
increase and access to services rather than tools for ensuring quality and accountability 
in service delivery. Although the arrangement contributes to the increased access to 
health services, it is not cost-effective and the quality of services in church health facili-
ties remains low, because the process is filled with management and governance chal-
lenges. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health is often accused of delaying payments to the 
church health service providers thereby sustaining the efficiency and accountability 
malaise. 
Keywords - Accountability, Contracting, Health Service 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to unearth the importance of having well structured, man-
aged, monitored and implemented contractual arrangement for the delivery of health 
services by external organisations and the consequences of the absence of the same. The 
focus is on service level contractual agreements that public health institutions enter with 
faith based organisations. According to the new public management paradigm, contracts 
are supposed to be well designed and managed for them to be effective in achieving the 
required service outcomes (see Peters, 2010). Yet in most cases, especially those involv-
ing faith based organisations in developing countries, contracts are informal and trust-
based without any serious specification of performance standards (Batley and Larbi, 
2004). What is agreed upon is the generalised view that “when NGOs are engaged in 
service delivery, the major focus is on financial and performance accountability” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2003:14). For faith based organisations, trust and confidence that these 
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organisations command mean that the fulfilment of accountability requirements in ser-
vice delivery is taken for granted. In this realm, Pulmer (2006: 237) observes that 
“rightly or wrongly there is less concern that faith-based groups may behave opportun-
istically or fraudulently”. But this paper finds that although the contractual relationship 
between district health offices and faith based providers has been instrumental in in-
creasing access to health services, there have been many accountability and service de-
livery challenges. This is particularly the case in contracts that have been poorly de-
signed, implemented and suffer from a lack of strong management provisions. The 
problem has been that the success in increased access has been so overwhelming that 
the problems of accountability on the part of the service-providing church-based organi-
sations have been overshadowed. In particular, due to their being faith based, the partic-
ipating church providers are granted trust and confidence. As a result, appropriate man-
agement and monitoring measures to ensure increased accountability have not been put 
in place. Over-invoicing, transparency and governance problems abound, risking the 
quality of services offered and the cost effectiveness of the whole arrangement. In order 
to unearth these issues the paper is guided by the following research questions: 
 What are the management challenges in contracting out of health services in 
Malawi 
 What are the accountability and transparency challenges in contracting out of 
health services in Malawi 
 What are the implications of the challenges on cost effectiveness and quality 
of services 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper is chiefly based on empirical qualitative and secondary data. Empirical data 
was collected through in-depth individual interviews and focus group discussions car-
ried out with Ministry of Health (MOH) headquarters officials, District Health Man-
agement team members, and Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) hospital 
officials in five districts in the country. Malawi is divided into three administrative re-
gions within which are districts. Two districts were purposively sampled in the Southern 
Region, two in Central Region and one District in the Northern Region. In each district, 
a CHAM facility and a MOH facility was chosen to carry out focus group discussions 
and interviews. Together, 10 focus group discussions (FGDs) were done in CHAM hos-
pitals (5 FGDs) and MOH facilities (5 FGDs) with nurses and technicians. In addition 8 
in-depth interviews were done with various officers at CHAM facilities while those 
from the MOH were 12. It was not possible to interview patients who were the benefi-
ciaries of health services due to ethical challenges. The qualitative data is supplemented 
by secondary statistical data. Secondary data was sourced from academic publications, 
government reports, and CHAM reports. For ethical purposes, as much as possible, the 
analysis ensured anonymity of the respondents. In this regard, the codes used for re-
sponses do not directly correspond to abbreviations of any district in the country. 
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THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Contracting Out 
Contracting out of public services has been one of the most attractive alternative ways 
of service delivery in the past decades for both developed and developing countries 
(Batley and Larbi, 2004). No wonder there is little contention about its definition as 
most studies (see for example McNamara, 2006; Siddiqi et al, 2006; Khan, 2009) settle 
for Taylor’s (2003:158) formulation that regards contracting out as a “purchasing mech-
anism used to acquire a specified service, of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed-
on price, from a specific provider, for a specific period”. In this respect, services that 
were previously provided in-house by the public sector are outsourced from nongov-
ernmental or other public providers. Theoretically, contracting out is mostly construed 
within the New Public Management (NPM) rhetoric of ensuring the purchaser/provider 
split (Ferlie et al, 1996; Sirverbo, 2003; Peters 2010). This is underpinned by the trans-
action cost theory; property rights theory; and principal agent theory (see Bruttel, 2005; 
Batley and Larbi, 2004). The transaction cost theory in terms of contracting out alludes 
to governance mechanism that ensures efficiency and cost effective means of service 
delivery. The property rights approach in contracting looks at the dilemmas of common 
ownership by advocates for contacts as “firms in private ownership are expected to 
work more efficiently because efficiency gains are directly attributable to an individual” 
(Bruttel, 2005). The principle agent theory is about accountability for results where con-
tracts are seen to provide a mechanism where the contractor works in the interest of the 
contractee by delivering the agreed upon performance targets and results. In this realm, 
penalties and rewards are distributed based on the extent to which contractual agree-
ments are achieved. 
It is in this context that contracting out encompasses a number of approaches whose 
underlying philosophy is paying for contractor performance and receiving results and 
outcomes. The specific variants include paying for performance/results (P4R) where a 
contractor is rewarded for quality improvements with higher payments (Keenan and 
Kline, 2004; Damberg et al, 2005); results based financing (RBF) where a “principal 
entity provides a financial or in-kind reward, conditional on the recipient of that reward 
undertaking a set of predetermined actions or achieving a predetermined performance 
goal” (Mumssen, Johannes and Kumar, 2010:3); and output based aid, which delegates 
“service delivery to a third party under contracts that link payment to the outputs or re-
sults delivered” (Smith, 2001). In short the operative theme in contracting out is paying 
for performance and getting results or outcomes. Although the common understanding 
is that contracting only goes to NGOs or the private-for-profit bodies, this is a fallacy as 
public or quasi-public entities can also be allowed to bid for and win contracts. This is 
the case as the contract is blind to the background of the provider and the only preoccu-
pation is that the provider delivers what has been agreed to. 
Management of Public Services Contracts and Accountability Challenges 
It must be noted that the availability of contracting arrangements alone is not enough to 
ensure effectiveness and accountability in service delivery. Proper management of the 
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contract ensures that the required contract deliverables and value for money are attained 
(House of Commons, 2009). In most cases contacts fail to deliver the promised results 
due to management problems. Contract management requires choosing a contractor, 
designing contracts, monitoring the contractor and supervising quality control and pen-
alties if results are not achieved (Prager, 1994). According to Doherty et al, (2014:165), 
the management competencies for effective execution of contracts include the “ability 
to embody service level agreements into contracts with performance and quality targets 
to monitor whether or not services are being delivered in accordance with the contract”. 
This is emphasised by Brown et al (2006:325) who highlights that the basic manage-
ment skills required for effective contracting include planning and coordinating service 
delivery; negotiating with vendors; monitoring task completion and executing incen-
tives. Management capacity in this regard in terms of designing, implementing and 
managing contract arrangement is necessary for the effective realisation of contractual 
ends. Batley and Larbi (2004: 167) highlight the necessary managerial antecedents in 
this regard which include the following: 
 The internal organisational factors needed to undertake contracting and man-
aging contractual relationships, including human resources and incentive sys-
tems, management systems, roles and relationships, capital and financial re-
sources; 
 Coordination and clarity of relations between the task network of organisa-
tions that together are responsible for contract design and implementation; and 
 The external environment and how it affects (enables or constraints) the mobi-
lisation and deployment of personnel and organisational capacity, including 
the public sector institutional context of rules, regulations, laws, policies and 
power relationships and the broader social, economic and political context 
within which public institutions and partners have to act, 
In developing country contexts, effective management of contracts has been seen to 
yield the planned results in Rwanda, Cambodia and Democratic Republic of Congo (see 
Soeters et al, 2006; Meessen et al, 2010). In these countries managing contracts effec-
tively has led to greater accountability, improved efficiency in service delivery and 
spill-over effect where it has helped to address several structural problems facing ser-
vice delivery (Meessen et al, 2010). In the same vein, poorly designed and managed 
contacts result in inefficient service delivery and accountability challenges on the part of 
the service provider. As Peters (2010: 298) elucidates, contracts may be “desirable from 
an economic perspective, but they present their own administrative challenges, especial-
ly control and accountability”. Here, contracting has “important implications for ac-
countability because such a process may increase services but dilute government control 
and accountability” (Johnston, 1999:387). 
Increased accountability problems are seen as arising from contracting poorly managed 
contracting out arrangements. As Van Slyke (2002: 502) observes, the “ever-present 
political problem of accountability in public administration is only compounded with 
the addition of nongovernmental organizations carrying out the public’s work”. In this 
regard, the complexity of contracting arrangements, institutional requirements, transac-
tion costs and new management skills needed pose a challenge in so far as the account-
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ability questions are concerned. This is compounded by the absence of competition in 
contracting out activities especially in developing country cases where markets are un-
derdeveloped and the motivation for contracting out is to service underserviced area 
rather than competition. In this case, mere strategic location of the non-governmental 
providers in such areas is seen as a guarantee for providing the service. It is in this realm 
that Johnston and Romzek (1999:386) warns that the “absence of a competitive provider 
environment requires particularly strict attention to accountability mechanisms because 
market discipline is lacking”. Therefore, the contracting relationship is feared to “create 
serious public management and accountability problems for which public administration 
theory fails to prepare us” (Van Slyke, 2002: 500). These accountability challenges are 
not only limited to the public sector but also the contracted non-governmental providers 
(Johnston, 2004). The daunting challenge for contracting management therefore is to 
cultivate the performance promises of contracting out scenarios without compromising 
on accountability (Brown and Potoski, 2005: 326). 
CONTRACTING  OUT OF HEALTH SERVICES IN MALAWI: SERVICE LEVEL 
AGREEMENTS  
Banda and Simukonda (1994:67) noted that the Malawi Ministry of Health (MOH) has 
“neither the manpower nor the material resources to fulfil its mandate of raising the 
health of all Malawians by reducing the incidence of illness and death in the popula-
tion”. This is proven by the fact that it provides 60% of health services while the re-
maining is covered by church based (37%) and other private (3%) providers (Malawi 
Government 2004). Government services are for free while other providers place a 
charge. Faith based health service providers operate under the umbrella organisation 
called Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM). The individual providers under 
CHAM belong to various church denominations and operate independently of each oth-
er, making autonomous business, managerial and operational decisions depending on 
their location and need. 
Most of the CHAM hospitals operate in rural areas where government health services 
are unavailable. Paradoxically, in these rural districts, most people are too poor to afford 
payment at the CHAM health services. Specifically, poverty in Malawi is “widespread, 
deep and severe” (Malawi Government, 2002), with 52.4% of the population living be-
low the poverty line (Malawi Government ,2006) and the majority of these living in 
rural districts, accounting for 59.9% (World Bank, 2007). The unavailability of MOH 
services in the context of poverty in these areas means that the majority of the people 
would not have access to health services. For example it was noted during the study at 
Embangweni CHAM hospital that women were paying K200
1
 for normal delivery but 
many could not afford it and were choosing to deliver at home. 
It is for this reason that the Malawi Government entered into contractual agreement with 
CHAM hospitals to provide health services to the poor. These contractual arrangements 
are also referred to as Service Level Agreements (SLA). In this respect, the Memoran-
dum of Understanding articulates that “service agreements shall be established wherever 
possible as a mechanism for maximising efficiency in the management of health service 
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and maximising access of the population at large to hospital services” (Malawi Gov-
ernment and CHAM, 2002:7). These agreements are made with individual CHAM and 
government district hospitals depending on the services the hospitals provide. The ar-
rangement made is that people access the health facilities without paying, and CHAM 
facilities bill MOH through District Health Offices. In addition, the MOH supplements 
salaries of medical staff member at government rates. On its part, the Government 
commits itself to “provide financial assistance in cases where service agreement is in 
operation” (Malawi Government and CHAM: 2002: 8). It also encourages District 
Health Officers to “enter into service agreements or contracts with CHAM facilities 
(and indeed other providers of health services) where appropriate, in order to facilitate 
communities accessing EHP services free of charge in line with government policy” 
(Ministry of Health, 2005: 16). Although the scale of services differs from district to 
district, not all services are currently covered under this arrangement. In most cases, the 
services covered are those classified under Essential Health Package (EHP) framework. 
According to the World Health Organisation (2008:2) the EHP framework “in a low 
income countries consists of a limited list of public health and clinical services which 
will be provided at primary and/or secondary care level”. For Malawi, the EHP frame-
work comprises of services that address major causes of death and disease which in-
clude: vaccine-preventable diseases; malaria; Adverse maternal and neonatal outcomes 
(including family planning); tuberculosis (TB); acute respiratory infection; acute diar-
rhoeal diseases; sexually transmitted infections (STI), including HIV and AIDS; schis-
tosomiasis; nutritional deficiencies; eye, ear and skin infections; and common injuries 
(Ministry of Health and Population/UNICEF, 2002). 
The study revealed that the contracting out arrangement has provided dividends in terms 
of increased access to health services. This is the case as those that were previously ex-
cluded from these services on the account of user fees from CHAM facilities can now 
access them. To this end, the MOH (2011) even agrees that “evidence shows that the 
removal of user fees in CHAM facilities has resulted in an increase in the number of 
patients seeking care in these facilities”. In addition, it has also reduced the workload at 
government hospitals as some cases that could go to these hospitals in search of free 
services are now handled at CHAM hospitals. To illustrate these benefits, a case study 
of a contractual agreement between Namikango Maternity Clinic and Zomba District 
Health Office is used. Namikango Maternity Clinic went into service agreement with 
the Ministry of Health on 1
st
 May 2008. The objective of the agreement was to partner 
with government in the delivery of maternal health services and to thereby improve the 
health status through improved access to maternal health delivery. Below is perfor-
mance statics in terms of access before and after the contracting out arrangement. 
Table 1: Performance Statistics for period 1
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Namikango Maternity Clinic, 2009 



































62 69 43 47 63 65 66 29 42 35 60 641 
Normal 
delivery  
38 41 35 47 50 36 45 41 42 35 42 39 491 
Delivery 
/Suturing 
- - - - - - - - - - - -- -- 
Referrals  7 12 12 14 6 3 10 13 1 7 6 6 97 
Total No 
of cases 
105 115 116 104 103 102 120 120 72 84 83 105 1229 
Namikango Maternity Clinic, 2009 
As can be seen from the statistics in tables 1 and 2 above, there has been a sharp in-
crease in traffic volume for the Clinic in percentage terms in the period where the con-
tractual arrangement was done. In particular, the overall number of cases seen has in-
creased by 106%, deliveries 70%, referrals 22%, and antenatal 146%. This indicates 
increased access to health services arising from the contracting out arrangement. Mean-
while, CHAM facilities have increased income which is critical for their sustained oper-
ations. For instance, as can be seen in table 3 below, in the case of Namikango Materni-
ty Clinic there has been an up to 62% increase in income as compared to the time when 
the arrangement was not yet in place. 
Table 3: Income comparison before and after SLA 
PERIOD Cumulative income (MK) REMARKS  
May ’08 to April, ‘09 1,285,793.00 62% increase over previous year  
May ’07 to April ‘08 794, 970.00 
Namikango Maternity Clinic, 2009 
Management and Accountability Challenges in the SLA Arrangement 
Johnston et al (2004: 158) articulate that the management challenge in government con-
tracting is to “capture the benefits of the contract relationship without losing accounta-
Normal 
delivery  
41 42 36 55 66 58 81 81 56 49 79 77 721 
Deliver 
/Suturing 
7 9 8 25 14 4 20 17 2 6 11 13 115 
Referrals  7 6 13 13 12 12 10 5 4 10 13 13 118 
Total No 
of cases 
167 208 191 207 252 200 225 216 191 201 263 224 253
4 
When Public Services Contracts are Poorly Managed: An Analysis of Malawi’s Service Level Agreements 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2014 
 www.ipmr.net  90 IPMR
bility. This challenge is not limited to the public sector”. It would seem that the high 
performance record of contracting out in terms of increased access as highlighted above 
has overshadowed the requirements of accountability especially on the part of CHAM 
facilities due lack of active contract management. Meanwhile, on the part of the MOH, 
lack of effective monitoring systems exacerbated by the faith and trust placed on 
CHAM facilities, owing to them being church based just sustain the situation. In partic-
ular it was noted that CHAM facilities over-invoice the MOH and have various govern-
ance challenges that undermine their accountability requirements as articulated below. 
According to the contracting out arrangement, patients are supposed to access services 
from CHAM facilities without payment and CHAM hospitals would then invoice the 
contracting government district health offices (DHOs) that would pay the amount. The 
price of drugs and services provided are based on pre-agreed amounts by both the con-
tracting DHOs and CHAM facilities. For example in Mzimba, it was noted that “at the 
beginning of the service level agreement between Mzimba DHO and Embangweni, a 
ceiling of money was provided as a standard measure calculated upon the following 
factors, population (catchment area inclusive) and maternal services provided at the 
hospital
2
”. But the study established that since there are no effective management 
mechanisms, in most cases CHAM facilities deliberately over-invoice DHOs. In all the 
sites visited, the problem of inflation of figures by CHAM facilities was reported. For 
instance, minutes of management team at one site read “there is an observation on 
monthly increased quotations (invoices) which refers that we are being over-charged3”. 
This was confirmed by in-depth interviews in all the sites visited. In this regard, an in-
terview with a District Health Officer at one point revealed that: 
Inflation of the figures is the main challenge. When we went to see the actual fig-
ures which were referred we said ‘ok these were the cases that you said you 
solved can we go to the referral notes and case note to see if they match’. We 
found that some issues they indicated that they did were not on the case notes and 
referral notes so this indicated that some of the figures were inflated (Interview at 
site Y, 18 May 2009). 
This was corroborated by a Hospital Administrator at another site who lamented that 
As District hospital, we were expressing dissatisfaction over inflation of figures. 
Because when they were bringing in retains in terms of the monies we had to pay, 
we felt that the names were exaggerated or rather the figures were inflated for 
them to meet some of their operational costs. So they were seeing the whole ar-
rangement as income generating for their activities. This was indeed happening 
and from every now and then at the hospital meetings we could question why this 
figure is too high (Interview at cite W, 28 April 2009) 
At yet at another site the view was that 
The major issue is that you would see that the invoices that come from CHAM 
hospitals are way off the mark. They over invoice it. I can give you an example 
where we agreed about K 450, 000 on average per month. But now it’s like K 
800,000 or K 900, 000 and sometimes a million. It’s double as much. So in such 
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way you find that management in CHAM hospitals is not helping to monitor such 
activities (Interview with DHO at site A, 17 April 2009). 
There were divergent views as to the responsibility of these malpractices within the 
CHAM institutions. While some respondents held the view that the over-invoicing was 
a result of individual employee mistakes and benefit seeking, others thought that this 
was institutional ploy on the part of CHAM facilities to increase their financial stand-
ing. For instance, one respondent holding a former view outlined that “I would not think 
it is within policies of an institution, maybe it is because some workers within the insti-
tution who wish to make more money anyway. But it may not have been out the agree-
ment” (Interview with Hospital Administrator at site A, 17 April 2009). Another con-
curred that “this is more of individual than institutional because when you discuss with 
their management they deny it” (Interview with site J DHO, 18 May 2009); however, 
looking at the acute financial problems that the CHAM hospitals face even within the 
confines of increased financial outlays emanating from the contracting arrangement, it 
would be more appealing to conclude that these malpractices are organisationally engi-
neered so as to meet their operational cost. CHAM facilities lack the necessary financial 
resources so that the contracting-out arrangement bails them out. As a Hospital Admin-
istrator at site W said, “figures were inflated for them to meet some of their operational 
costs”. In fact an Administrator at a CHAM hospitals said that “if government pulls out 
[of the contract], that will also be the end of the hospital. The contracting-out is the area 
where the hospital is making a lot of money... Those people will not be able to be pay-
ing at cost and the hospital will die out. Obviously if that agreement is terminated today 
the hospital cannot survive, it cannot” (Interview with CHAM Official 10 April 2009). 
In this regard, responses from the MOH officials were quite revealing. A DHO com-
mented that 
From what we saw at place A
4
 when clerks were interviewed some said they were 
just told to do that. The hospital as an organisation says “we do not have funds 
and what do we do?” Because they know the DHOs have monies for service level 
agreement and even if they raise the bill the DHO would still pay because they 
have money there. So the inflation of figures is just to find one way of maximising 
the tapping of that money (Interview with DHO at site V, 18 May 2009) 
An Administrator at another district hospitals visited said that 
If you look at the whole issue it would appear that the CHAM hospitals have no 
resource for them to run. So it would appear that some workers within the CHAM 
hospitals would see this as a way to finance it. CHAM people look at it as a way 
of sourcing finances for their operation. You look at CHAM hospital G
5
 it was 
closed because they had no money to run. But we refused them because they came 
here to lobby their way through so that we can have an agreement but we had 
some other privileged information about their finances and we said no to them. So 
what happened was that two, three months down the line they closed. What it 
meant was that we would enter into a very difficult problem. (Interview at cite J, 
17 April 2009). 
 
When Public Services Contracts are Poorly Managed: An Analysis of Malawi’s Service Level Agreements 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2014 
 www.ipmr.net  92 IPMR
This was corroborated by an FGD participant who observed that 
I do not think that this is individual since when the money goes to CHAM is not 
for the individual processing the transactions that benefits but rather the institu-
tion. The cheque goes to the hospital and not the person. Even when you over-
charge you cannot separate the payments so that some money should be privately 
pocketed as this is consolidated and goes as one payment so there is no room for 
individual benefits. After all they don’t pay cash so that one can take the other 
money out- it is all cheque which is payable to the organisation. So this over in-
voicing is more for the organisational benefit (FGD with site V officials, 4 March 
2009) 
On the government side, there is a lack of monitoring mechanisms that would ensure 
increased accountability in the system. It would appear that the CHAM institutions are 
just left alone to operate without deliberate managerial interventions to monitor and 
control malpractices. In one such institution, an Administrator at one of the district 
health offices visited hinted that “we are having problems of supervision” (Interview 
with at site A, 17 April 2009). This was echoed by a participant at a focus group discus-
sion who said that “we do not know if this system was fine-tuned as there are a lot of 
abuses. How will they know the hospital attended to so many clients and this bill is re-
flecting the number really attended to? They can charge a person who has actually paid 
money but put him on service agreement so that there is double charging without us 
knowing” (FGD with site Y officials, 28 April 2009). Moreover, despite the contract 
agreements stipulations, there is a marked institutional boundary between the CHAM 
facilities and DHOs. In this regard, the DHOs, though they are technical managers on 
health issues in a district regardless of facility ownership, they do not interfere in ad-
ministrative and managerial affairs. As one DHO articulated, 
The DHO cannot do anything in this regard...because there is no direct line ad-
ministratively. They are a separate entity... The DHO is the overseer of health ser-
vices in the district regardless of who owns the facility, but as regards to monitor-
ing and disciplining of CHAM facilities-that line is not there...There is a limita-
tion. You cannot go in and dictate to say you have done a,b,c,d things that are not 
applicable (Interview with DHO at site J, 28
th 
April 2009) 
The problem is exacerbated by the trust and confidence in church organisations under 
Malawi command. It would appear that lack of monitoring in the contract arrangement 
is as a result of trust and confidence that the MOH places on CHAM’s faith-based fa-
cilities. As one DHO lamented, “CHAM has lost its ethics and it is becoming money 
hungry facility” (Interview with DHO at site V, 4 March 2009). The problem is that 
even within the confines of the revelations of accountability malpractices; the religious 
nature of the organisations makes it difficult for the MOH officials to address the prob-
lem. As one hospital administrator said, “how do you confront an institution that is sup-
posedly based on principals of Christianity, so it creates problems” (Interview at cite W, 
17 April 2009). 
On their part, the CHAM hospital officials complain of under-costing of services in the 
contracting-out agreements, which points to the problems of poor design and manage-
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ment of their contracts. The problem is that prices are not uniform in all arrangements 
but instead differ from district to district. In most districts, prices are based on govern-
ment’s pharmaceutical arm, the Central Medical Stores (CMS), which are very low 
compared to most private pharmacies. But in most cases the CMS does not have medi-
cal supplies, forcing CHAM hospitals to purchase from private traders at a higher price. 
In addition, the study found that the contract agreements only consider simple proce-
dures under EHP which are cheaper but not do not go any further with operations in the 
event of complications. For example, a Director at one CHAM hospital outlined that 
“the agreement only considers caesarean section so the assumption was everything goes 
on smoothly there will not be any complications but we have noted that many times the 
patient would go to theatre maybe more that once because of the complications that 
have arose from the initial procedure so when we send these other costs they say no, it’s 
not part of the agreement so we are saying aren’t we disturbing the agreement” (inter-
view with a Director of a CHAM Hospital, 18 May 2009). 
Moreover, CHAM facilities also accuse MOH of not making timely payments, affecting 
their operations. The problem is that CHAM facilities do not have a reliable source of 
funding and rely very much on the money from contracts. In this regard, they would like 
DHOs to pay them instantly. But the system of government funding to district hospitals 
is so slow and inefficient that the operation of CHAM facilities are adversely affected. 
With political decentralisation brought into the equation, the flow of monthly govern-
ment funding moves from the Ministry of Finance to District Councils and then passes 
to the DHOs. The timing of funding is not constant as cash flow at the Treasury can be 
unpredictable, and transaction decisions at all stages of funding flow, including the 
MOH headquarters, can affect the speed at which the DHOs recieve funding. In this 
realm, a DHO commented that “it reaches the 16
th
 of the month before we have received 
funding...funding comes very late and they accuse us of delaying payment. It is beyond 
our control. Because they have become money hungry and so reliable on government, 
they do not understand. We cannot pull money from our pockets” (Interview at site W, 
4 March 2009). A documentary analysis revealed that while the CHAM facilities com-
plain about delayed funding, the delay is substantial enough to adversely affect their 
services. For example, while Namikango Maternity Clinic complained that there were 
“delays in effecting payment which is an adverse effect on our cash flow for our opera-
tions,
6
” it can be seen in table 4 below that the average number of days after the facility 
had issued an invoice to DHOs was 23 days. This is reasonable considering the adminis-
trative, transactional, and technical procedures that have to be undertaken as discussed 
above. 
Table 4: Payment Record for Agreement 







































Date 12 12 7 8 Sept 13 11 3 Dec 8 Jan 6 Feb 6 Mar 6 
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Namikango Maternity Clinic, 2009 
MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY CHALLENGES IN THE -SLA ARRANGEMENT 
Transparency as espoused by the requirement to disclose public and corporate financial 
information to stakeholders is pivotal for reinforcing accountability as it empowers the 
necessary stakeholders (Solomon, 2007; Larriaga et al, 2002; Coy and Dixon, 2004). In 
this respect, the transparency requirements for the contract arrangement as stipulated in 
the Memorandum of Understanding is the need to “disclose in a disaggregated format 
all sources of external and internal funding received or generated and all expenditure 
undertaken that pertain to the health sector” (Malawi Government and CHAM: 2002:9). 
This requirement is assumed to go a long way in ensuring transparency on the perfor-
mance of CHAM hospitals. This disclosure is both to the MOH through the DHOs and 
to CHAM headquarters. 
But the study found that in most cases the CHAM facilities do not submit the said re-
ports to either organisation. In this regard, the Deputy Executive Director of CHAM has 
been expressing concern that “units were not submitting accounts to the Secretariat. As 
of 30
th
 September 2004, no units had submitted any expenditure report. He therefore 
expressed the need for units to submit expenditure reports as they are important for 
transparency and accountability” (CHAM Meeting Munities, 22 October 2005:8). In 
addition, the requirement for disclosure does not only mean financial reporting but also 
the involvement of concerned stakeholders in the budgeting and planning processes. 
This is the case as “financial accounts may conceal more than they reveal and, therefore, 
that accountability requires disclosure of reasons for, and explanations of, actions tak-
en” (Coy and Dixon, 2004:81The study noted that DHOs expected CHAM hospitals to 
involve them in their budgeting and planning processes, which they hardly did. One 
DHO commented that “we are supposed to be open. Our friends (CHAM hospital) are 
not transparent as regards to their budget. But the service level agreement itself dictates 
that we should be open, they should know our budget and equally we should know their 
budget. When we are developing our plans and coming up with our budget we invite 
them and they are part of the process but when they are doing theirs, they do not invite 
us”. (Interview at site A, 28
th 
April 2009). This was echoed by an FDG participant who 
underlined that “the CHAM hospitals do not discuss with us their budget; they just tell 
us what they want. So the management team complains that CHAM is not transparent” 
(FGD at site A, 28 April 2009). 
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Even worse, a review of an internal audit report for CHAM facilities portrayed several 
governance problems that are feared to have massive implications on accountability 
challenges outlined above. For instance, it was highlighted that in most cases there were 
delayed appointment of board members for CHAM facilities who are pivotal in enforc-
ing accountability and transparency requirements. In this regard, at one site it was noted 
that the period for outgoing board members expired on 31 December 2005 and because 
of delay in appointing new members, their term of office was extended. Letters of new 
appointments were written on 9
th
 July 2008 while the Hospital Administrator was in-
formed of new appointments in a letter written on 7
th
 March 2008 (CHAM internal audit 
report, 21 May 2008:3). 
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS ON COST EFFECTIVENESS AND QUALITY OF SERVICES 
Accountability and transparency have been proven to be the major problems of contract-
ing in the context of weak management. As Peters (2010:299) illustrates, incompetence 
on the part of public sector managers present risks of the private providers not being 
accountable and displaying other ‘unethical behaviours’. This study has unearthed that 
lack of proper management practices for contracting out has the potential of presenting 
accountability and transparency challenges. The case of Malawi reveals that lack of 
performance management measures and agreements may result in losing out on the im-
portant aspects of accountability and transparency. This is applicable even in contracts 
with faith based organisations which by their nature are supposed to be operating even 
more “fastidiously (than) we expect the public sector to be” (Peters, 2010). In particular, 
lack of performance agreements upon which the effectiveness of contracts with faith 
based organisations would be measured imply that there is no management tool to as-
sess the effectiveness of the same. This is juxtaposed with lack of proper monitoring 
mechanism in terms of how the faith based providers are operating. The House of 
Commons (2009) elucidates that having “performance measures and keeping them up-
to-date is essential for managing supplier performance”. In addition, management chal-
lenges arise as there are no punishments and incentives for contracts performance in the 
SLA arrangements. The SLAs do not stipulate any measures to be taken in accountabil-
ity issues are not adhered to by both parties thereby encouraging unethical behaviour. 
This is against the managerial requirement that “good contract management should also 
include financial incentives to encourage suppliers to improve performance” (House of 
Commons, 2009). 
But this scenario presents implications in terms of the citizens getting the value for 
money, especially on the aspect of cost effectiveness and quality of services. As per 
Peters’ (2010:299) advice, “government agencies contracting with the private sector 
should monitor their contracts as well as they can to ensure that the public gets value for 
money”. This is against the back drop of the fact that contracting out is also assumed to 
be a cost effective way of delivering services on the part of government (Liu, Hotchkiss 
and Bose, 2007; Khan and Ahmed. 2003.). In this respect, the expectations were that 
there would be savings in the SLA in Malawi, as it would go a long way in saving the 
MOH from constructing clinics and delivering services in areas where CHAM facilities 
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operated. But in the context of the accountability challenges outlined above, the whole 
contracting out arrangement is a remarkably expensive undertaking. It is not cost-
effective and the MOH would be in a better position in reducing costs if it engaged on 
in-house provision than contracting. This compelled the MOH to include a review of 
costs, cost effectiveness and value for money for SLAs in its 2011-2016 Strategic Plan 
(MOH, 2011:51). The issue here is that these SLA partnerships are expensive and not 
cost effective owing to the management and accountability challenges. 
In addition, although contracting out has facilitated increased access to health ser-
vices as outlined above, the resulting accountability challenges have implications 
for their quality of services. This is the case as the expectations were that CHAM 
units would be reinvesting the money in the delivery of service so as to cater for 
the increased demand of ‘free’ services arising from the contracting arrangement. 
But this study concluded that the increased financial resources coming from the 
contracting out are not effectively ploughed back into the CHAM facilities for en-
hanced delivery of services. Seen from this perspective, there are acute shortages 
of key staff like medical and clinical officers and critical equipment for health 
service delivery in CHAM facilities. Doherty et al., (2014:165) illustrates that 
contracts need to specify “service level to which the public will be entitled” there-
by allowing for effective participation of the citizenry in contract monitoring as a 
quality control measure. With the SLAs in Malawi, quality is also compromised 
as there are no management systems that would ensure the participation of the cli-
ent groups as a way of enhancing monitoring arrangements in terms of achieving 
high quality of services. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, contractual relationships that the Ministry of Health enters with faith-
based health service providers in Malawi are not effective due to poor design, imple-
mentation and management arrangements. Although the contracting out arrangements in 
the delivery of health services as employed in Malawi has been instrumental in increas-
ing access to health facilities, especially as many previously could not afford them,, any 
gains attained are fragile due to lack of proper contract management systems. The prob-
lem is that due to management limitations in terms of design and monitoring of the con-
tact infrastructure, there are accountability and transparency problems on the part of the 
service providing organisations. In particular, due to them being faith based, the partici-
pating church providers have been rendered a lot of trust and confidence so that appro-
priate managerial measures to ensure increased accountability have not been put in 
place. The problem is that this has had massive implications on quality of services of-
fered and the cost effectiveness of the whole arrangement. Meanwhile, the Ministry of 
Health is often accused of delaying payments to the church providers thereby sustaining 
the efficiency and accountability malaise. 
Richard Tambulasi is an Associate Professor in the Political and Administrative Studies Department 
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